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Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future 
Justin F. Marceau* 
While the animal rights and food justice movements are relatively 
young, their political unpopularity has generated a steady onslaught of 
legislation designed to curtail their effectiveness. At each stage of their 
nascent development, these movements have confronted a new wave of 
criminal or civil sanctions carefully tailored to combat the previous suc-
cesses the movements had achieved.  
Among the first wave of animal rights activists were those who 
would seek to liberate animals from harsh or inhumane treatment through 
criminal trespass and property crimes. Whatever one might think about 
the wisdom or propriety of the tactics of this first generation of activists, 
it is beyond dispute that those opposed to the animal activists were not 
satisfied with the existing criminal sanctions for crimes like trespass and 
theft. Instead, this band of daring scofflaws were labeled terrorists by 
federal legislation and now face some of the harshest sentences available 
in the criminal code.  
In recent years, most food and animal rights activists have aban-
doned direct action campaigns, perhaps in part because of the increased 
penalties that such crimes carry, and the well documented efforts (and 
abuses) on the part of the FBI to infiltrate animal rights groups and arrest 
persons involved in direct action.1 In this new era, words, rather than 
deeds, have become the primary form of advocacy for persons seeking to 
expose food justice and animal welfare issues. And in the age of mass 
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 1. See generally WILL POTTER, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (2011). 
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communication and the internet, the power of words and images can 
hardly be overstated.2 
But industry has responded. Those willing to speak negatively 
about agricultural production have been confronted with at least two 
unique limits on their ability to criticize the way our food is produced. 
First, the agricultural industry lobbied for, and frequently obtained, legis-
lation that provides for defamation liability without the defining limits of 
defamation. These distortions of defamation law, known as the food dis-
paragement laws,3 tend to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to 
the defendant (speaker), assume that statements critical of an industry are 
untrue unless there is definitive science to support the critique, or elimi-
nate the mens rea of maliciousness as to the falsity of a statement. Such 
changes reflect a marked shift in the contours of defamation and allow 
for potential liability for speech critical of food producers that would be 
unthinkable in any other context.  
And yet, at least the food disparagement laws, at their core, purport 
to target speech that is untrue. The most recent wave of anti-animal 
rights and anti-food justice laws, Ag Gag laws, criminalize efforts to 
produce true whistleblowing investigations in the agricultural context. 
Under an Ag Gag regime, the whistleblowing tactics of muckrakers like 
Upton Sinclair,4 which have shaped public law and opinion about food 
production, are subject to criminalization. Under Ag Gag laws, people 
who record unsafe or cruel workplace conditions at agricultural facilities 
may be incarcerated. Typically Ag Gag laws take the form of criminaliz-
ing the acts of recording or the conduct preparatory to producing truthful 
speech about the production of our food. But as legal challenges to the 
traditional Ag Gag laws progress through the courts and their constitu-
tionality increasingly called into question,5 some states are considering 
the next generation of Ag Gag laws and practices—that is, Ag Gag 2.0. 
This new form of legislation or judicial action would further limit whis-
                                                        
 2. Indeed, a recent Gallup Poll finds that over 30% of Americans now believe that animals 
should have the “same rights as people.” Rebecca Rifkin, In U.S., More Say Animals Should Have 
Same Rights as People, GALLUP (May 18, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183275/say-animals-
rights-people.aspx (noting a dramatic increase in this figure in recent years).  
 3. Food disparagement laws make it easier for food producers to sue their critics for libel by 
allowing a food manufacturer or processor to sue a person or group making disparaging comments 
about their products. Many of these laws establish a lower standard for civil liability and allow for 
greater damages by allowing for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. 
 4. Upton Sinclair was an American author who wrote nearly 100 books across several genres. 
His classic novel, The Jungle, exposed conditions in the United States meat packing industry. 
 5. At the time of writing this paper, Plaintiffs are awaiting the resolution of a motion for sum-
mary judgment in the District of Idaho, where the nation’s first challenge to an Ag Gag law is pend-
ing.  
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tleblowing activism in a number of ways, but two key examples are the 
rise of quick report laws and the creative use of trespass laws to suppress 
information about public harms. These types of limitations on whistle-
blowing are different in form, but the same in effect—they limit speech 
critical of the agricultural industry and function as Ag Gag laws.6  
This brief descriptive essay will proceed in four parts. I will first 
review the history of animal rights advocacy and prosecution. Second, I 
will describe the agricultural disparagement, or “meat libel,” statutes. 
Third, I will discuss current Ag Gag legislation. Finally, I will discuss 
the future of Ag Gag legislation. 
I. THE FIRST WAVE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS ADVOCACY AND PROSECUTION 
The modern animal rights movement began in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s7 with the overriding objective of reducing the amount of an-
imal suffering by eliminating the exploitation of animals by humans.8 
However, it would be a huge mistake to view the animal rights move-
ment as monolithic in its goals or methods.9 During the 1980s, members 
of the movement successfully brought cases of horrific animal abuse to 
the attention of the general public through conventional forms of social 
protest.10 At the same time, many activists also took a more direct ap-
                                                        
 6. Although on the surface it makes no sense to describe something that is not a law as an Ag 
Gag law, certain State actions have such a chilling effect on speech critical of food production as to 
fairly evince the spirit of Ag Gag. One such example is the decision to prosecute for animal abuse a 
person who records and reports on animal abuse, as was briefly considered by Colorado law en-
forcement authorities. See, e.g., Will Potter, Breaking: Undercover Investigator Charged with Ani-
mal Cruelty for Videotaping Farm Abuse, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/colorado-cok-investigation-taylor-radig/7403/.  
 7. See Michael Hill, United States v. Fullmer and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: “True 
Threats” to Advocacy, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 981, 982 (2011); see generally PETER SINGER, 
ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975); All About PETA, PETA, http://www.peta.org/about-peta/learn-about-
peta/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (PETA was founded in 1980, which catalyzed an interest and ener-
gy towards animal well-being); About Us, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://aldf.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2015) (describing the founding of ALDF in 1979). 
 8. See Hill, supra note 7, at 984; Laura G. Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals 
Board the Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 772 (1995). 
 9. See, e.g., James McWilliams, Animal Welfare vs. Animal Rights Abolitionism: Is Compro-
mise Possible?, DAILY PITCHFORK (Feb. 12, 2015), http://dailypitchfork.org/?p=625 (describing the 
debate between the animal welfare supporters who support the humane treatment of animals and 
animal rights supporters who believe that the only way animals can be treated humanely is to com-
pletely stop using them). 
 10. Philip M. Boffey, Animals in the Lab: Protests Accelerate, but Use Is Dropping, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/27/science/animals-in-the-lab-protests-
accelerate-but-use-is-dropping.html (describing how an animal rights activist’s findings, after he 
infiltrated a lab, led to a police raid and the freeing of the animals); DEBORAH RUDACILLE, THE 
SCALPEL AND THE BUTTERFLY: THE WAR BETWEEN ANIMAL RESEARCH AND ANIMAL PROTECTION 
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proach to alleviating animal suffering by engaging in various direct ac-
tion campaigns, including the liberation of confined animals.11 Certainly, 
animal rights activists are not unique in their use of a variety of both le-
gal and illegal methods to influence public opinion and advance their 
ends.12 However, it is fair to say that the early years of the animal rights 
movement in this country were characterized by a substantial number of 
effective, illegal actions.13 
By the late 1980s, direct action campaigns, in which criminal ac-
tivity played a substantial role, were helping the burgeoning animal 
rights movement gain momentum by stirring public interest. The first 
documented animal liberation in this country, committed in 1977 by 
Kenneth LeVasseur,14 was illustrative of the direct action that character-
ized this period in the movement.15 With the aid of several accomplices, 
LeVassuer released two dolphins into the wild after seeing that they were 
subjected to what he characterized as “life threatening conditions” at the 
                                                                                                                            
166–67 (2000) (describing how the cosmetic industry began to go “cruelty free” in response to criti-
cism of animal testing); see generally Hill, supra note 7. 
 11. Kniaz, supra note 8, at 776. 
 12. Denise Grady, Thelma Glass, Organizer of Alabama Bus Protests, Dies at 96, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/us/thelma-glass-organizer-of-alabama-bus-
protests-dies-at-96.html (describing how some black citizens were arrested during the famous Mont-
gomery Bus Boycott for conspiring to interfere with a business); Associated Press, South Carolina 
Judge Tosses Out Criminal Records for 9 Civil Rights Workers, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/01/civil_rights_workers_record_er.html (describing how 
the civil rights activists, the “Friendship 9,” were arrested for trespassing for a “sit-in” at a conven-
ience store); Freedom Day in Selma, http://www.crmvet.org/tim/tim63b.htm#1963fdselma (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2015) (describing how 300 arrests were made in two weeks for “sit-ins” and other 
protest activity). 
 13. Kniaz, supra note 8, at 778; Eco-Violence: The Record, S. POVERTY L. CENTER, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/fall/from-push-to-
shove/eco-violence-the-rec (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing animal rights activists as “extrem-
ists,” by stating that they “have committed literally thousands of violent criminal acts in recent dec-
ades—arguably more than those from any other radical sector, left or right”); Ben A. Franklin, Go-
ing to Extremes for “Animal Rights”, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/30/weekinreview/going-to-extremes-for-animal-rights.html (refer-
ring to animal liberations as “Rambo-style raid[s]” and “laboratory assaults”); Anthony Munoz, 
Campus Life: Michigan State; Animal Rights Raiders Destroy Years of Work, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/nyregion/campus-life-michigan-state-animal-rights-
raiders-destroy-years-of-work.html (characterizing activists as “vandals” who were destroying years 
of scientific research); Associated Press, Fire at UC Davis May Be Work of Animal Activists, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-04-17/news/mn-638_1_uc-davis-scientists 
(suggesting that Animal Liberation Front members were responsible for arson at an animal testing 
facility that was under construction because they were also investigated for vandalizing cars half a 
mile away). 
 14. LeVasseur was a researcher for the University of Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology as an 
undergraduate. 
 15. See Kniaz, supra note 8, at 807. 
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facility where they were held captive.16 As a result of the liberation, 
LeVasseur was arrested and charged with first-degree theft.17 
Several similar acts of animal liberation followed. For example, in 
1986, Roger Troen participated in an animal liberation at the University 
of Oregon as a getaway driver.18 Consequently, Troen was also criminal-
ly convicted, sentenced to five years of probation, and ordered to pay 
$35,000 in restitution to the University of Oregon.19 Rod Coronado, an-
other animal rights activist, was also involved in several liberations 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.20 Coronado liberated minks and coyotes 
from university research labs, including Oregon State University, Wash-
ington State University, and Michigan State University.21 He successful-
ly avoided arrest for his efforts until a lab at Michigan State University 
was burned down in 1992.22 Coronado was subsequently arrested and 
convicted for the arson, receiving a sentence of fifty-seven months in 
prison.23 While these examples were caught and arrested, other activists 
continued to liberate animals while avoiding arrest.24 
However, none of these criminal acts in the service of animal rights 
went unnoticed, and as the harm to the industry’s bottom line grew, the 
legislative response was swift and harsh. In 1992, Congress passed crim-
inal legislation that seemingly treated arson of a lab and the release of a 
puppy from a research lab as equivalent, and designated both as acts of 
                                                        
 16. State v. LaVasseur, 613 P.2d 1328, 1333 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980). 
 17. Id. at 1329 (During the appeals process, LeVasseur asserted a choice of evils defense, 
arguing that the conditions the dolphins were kept in violated the Animal Welfare Act, and that his 
choice of theft was preferable to letting the animals suffer. The court eventually decided that, as a 
matter of law, his crime of theft was a greater, or at least equivalent evil to the violation of the Ani-
mal Welfare Act and thus refused the defense and sentenced him to sixth months in jail with five 
years of probation.). 
 18. State v. Troen, 786 P.2d 751, 753 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (During the appeals process, Troen 
also asserted a choice of evils defense based on the fact that the animals were suffering, and he made 
the lesser choice of evil to release them. The court held that the University was not violating any 
federal law and barred Troen’s defense.); Kniaz, supra note 8, at 811. 
 19. Kniaz, supra note 8, at 813. 
 20. Jeffery St. Clair, Firebrand: Rod Coronado’s Flame War, COUNTERPUNCH (June 19, 
2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/espa2009/06/19/firebrand-rod-coronado-s-flame-war/. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Ron Catlett, Convicted Eco-Terrorist Leads “Yellowstone Wolf Patrol” in Montana Media 
Trackers, MEDIATRACKERS (Sept. 17, 2014), http://mediatrackers.org/montana/2014/09/17/ 
convicted-eco-terrorist-leads-yellowstone-wolf-patrol-montana. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The Silver Spring Monkeys: The Case That Launched PETA, PETA, 
http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-experimentation/silver-spring-monkeys/ (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2015) (describing how in 1981 an activist successfully infiltrated a research lab, document-
ed and videotaped evidence of animal abuse, and got the experimenters at the lab arrested); see 
Franklin, supra note 13 (describing how in 1985 animal rights activists successfully liberated 460 
animals from the University of California, Riverside). 
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“terror.”25 Specifically, Congress passed, and President Bush signed into 
law, the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA).26 The AEPA states 
that anyone who causes “physical disruption to the functioning of an an-
imal enterprise” shall be guilty of an offense designated a terrorism 
crime.27 Physically disrupting an animal enterprise—including just re-
leasing an animal—was deemed an act of terrorism punishable by 
lengthy imprisonment.  
Savvy animal rights advocates, now facing the possibility of long 
prison sentences for releasing animals directly—even animals that were 
at imminent risk of death or torture—looked to another tried and tested 
method of activism. This popular method involved engaging in corporate 
pressure through boycotts and other less seemly methods. 
A now infamous group of seven young, highly educated people, 
known as the SHAC-7, created one of the most effective and ingenious 
efforts to confront corporate apathy towards animal suffering. The ani-
mal rights group Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) existed sole-
ly to put the pharmaceutical testing lab Huntingdon—the largest animal 
testing lab in Europe—out of business.28 SHAC sought to achieve this 
goal, not by destroying property, but by hosting a website.29 The website 
published “names, home addresses and telephone numbers of executives 
and employees of Huntingdon and any companies [that Huntingdon did 
business with.]”30 SHAC urged its supporters to contact those people and 
pressure them to abandon the use or support of animal testing.31 In May 
2004, following a three-year investigation involving over 100 federal 
agents from different agencies, seven members of SHAC USA, now 
known as the SHAC-7, were indicted by a grand jury for violations of the 
AEPA.32 The website run by the group was deemed to be a conspiracy to 
violate the AEPA.33 Years of investigation, hundreds of agents and fed-
eral resources were devoted to ensuring the prosecution of seven young 
                                                        
 25. DARA LOVITZ, MUZZLING A MOVEMENT 48–50 (2010). 
 26. See Hill, supra note 7, at 991. Commentators have explained that the “motivation for pass-
ing the AEPA into law was largely financial.” Id. at 50–51 (detailing the financial contributions to 
the legislation’s sponsors from the agricultural industry). 
 27. Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (1992) (cod-
ified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)). 
 28. John Cook, Thugs for Puppies, SALON (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.salon.com/2006/02/07/ 
thugs_puppies/. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. SHAC also engaged in a variety of other pressure tactics through its website. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. For a more complete summary of the prosecution of the SHAC-7, see LOVITZ, supra 
note 25, at 63–72. 
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people for conspiring to cause harm to a business. The government’s dis-
dain for the movement is made patently clear by such overreaching—at a 
time when less than half of reported rapes result in arrests, it is striking 
that law enforcement would devote so many resources to the prosecution 
of persons hosting a website.34  
Moreover, despite the successful use of the AEPA to prosecute the 
SHAC-7, Congress used the September 11 attacks to further vilify direct 
action animal rights activists. In the wake of the attack on the Twin Tow-
ers in New York, at least one congressman expressed the view that there 
was a “strong possibility” that eco-terrorists were responsible.35 In 2006, 
Congress raised the stakes for interfering with animal operations by pass-
ing the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA).36 The AETA is broad-
er than its precursor in several regards. First, while the AEPA required a 
person to act with the intent to cause physical disruption to an animal 
enterprise’s functioning, the AETA only requires an intent to “damag[e] 
or interfer[e] with the operations of an animal enterprise.”37 The “damag-
ing or interfering” language in the AETA provides a more lenient stand-
ard than the “physical disruption” language in the AEPA.38 Additionally, 
the AETA allows for prosecution if a person causes damage to an animal 
enterprise, or to any property owned by a company that has a relationship 
with an animal enterprise.39 This change seems directly responsive to 
SHAC-7’s method of publicly listing businesses that had a relationship 
with Huntingdon labs on the SHAC website.40 Moreover, unlike its pre-
decessor which focused on physical damage, under the AETA, merely 
causing economic injury subjects one to criminal liability and a prison 
sentence of up to twenty years.41 
                                                        
 34. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Katharine Tellis, Justice Denied?: The Exceptional Clearance of 
Rape Cases in Los Angeles, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1416 (2011) (noting that in some urban areas the 
“‘true’ arrest rates (i.e., the percentage of cases that were cleared by the arrest of a suspect)” were 
35% or lower); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS (1997), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF (reporting that nationally about half of 
all forcible rapes result in an arrest).  
 35. LOVITZ, supra note 25, at 56 (quoting Representative Don Young). 
 36. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (2006) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Will Potter, Analysis of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, GREEN IS THE NEW RED, 
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/aeta-analysis-109th/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A) (2006); Potter, supra note 38. 
 40. Potter, supra note 38. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006) (“[P]unishment for a violation shall be . . . not more than 1 
year . . . if the offense . . . does not instill in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or 
death and . . . results in economic damage that does not exceed $10,000 . . . not more than 5 
years . . . if no bodily injury occurs and . . . results in economic damage exceeding $10,000 but not 
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF AGRICULTURAL DISPARAGEMENT OR “MEAT 
LIBEL” STATUTES 
A. What Is Meat Libel? 
Most activists, facing decades in prison, have turned away from 
crime and towards more soapbox activism: getting the message out. For 
better or for worse, the animal rights movement began to move above-
ground, engaging in more public debate (and litigation)42 than private 
sabotage.43 The industry has responded to this new, and effective, form 
of protest. The rise of food disparagement or “meat libel” laws (dis-
cussed immediately below) reflect an effort to control the debate, and the 
enactment of Ag Gag laws (discussed in the subsequent section) serves 
to cut off some of the most critical information in the debate. 
Agricultural disparagement is a form of defamation—injury to rep-
utation—and agricultural disparagement statutes, commonly referred to 
as meat or veggie libel laws, make it “easier for farmers to file product 
disparagement suits” against persons who criticize their products.44 The-
se laws first emerged in the early 1990s following a 60 Minutes segment 
on CBS about chemical usage in growing apples.45 The segment was 
based on a report released by the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC), which found that a chemical known as Alar, commonly used 
for growing apples, could pose a danger to children.46 Following this 
                                                                                                                            
exceeding $100,000 . . . not more than 10 years . . . if . . . offense results in economic damage ex-
ceeding $100,000 . . . not more than 20 years . . . if . . . offense results in economic damage exceed-
ing $1,000,000 . . . .”). At the time of writing, the Center for Constitutional Rights is currently repre-
senting some liberators who have been charged under AETA, and is litigating the constitutionality of 
the statute. See United States v. Johnson, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/US-v-Johnson (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (describing the case of Kevin 
Johnson and Tyler Lang, two activists arrested under the AETA for allegedly liberating mink and 
foxes from fur farms and the attempts by the Center for Constitutional Rights to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the AETA). 
 42. There are now organizations whose very mission focuses on using the law and legal sys-
tem, as opposed to breaking the law, to improve the lives of animals. See, e.g., About Us, ANIMAL 
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://aldf.org/about-us/ (last visited May 30, 2015).  
 43. Dara Lovitz has explained that even beyond curbing criminal behavior, the enactment of 
terrorism legislation has actually chilled animal advocacy more generally. LOVITZ, supra, note 25, at 
105–20. 
 44. GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 11.03 (3d ed. 
2013), available at 2013 WL 3924200. 
 45. Megan W. Semple, Veggie Libel Meets Free Speech: A Constitutional Analysis of Agricul-
tural Disparagement Laws, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 403, 403–04 (1996). 
 46. See generally BRADFORD H. SEWELL & ROBIN M. WHYATT, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, INTOLERABLE RISK: PESTICIDES IN OUR CHILDREN’S FOOD (1989). 
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segment, apple sales in Washington State fell drastically.47 Apple grow-
ers in Washington State faced economic losses, possibly as high as $75 
million.48 In response, 4,700 Washington State apple growers banded 
together and brought a class action suit for product disparagement 
against the NRDC and CBS, attempting to recover damages for the fi-
nancial losses the report and segment had caused.49 The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of CBS, finding that the apple growers had 
failed to provide sufficient facts to show that any statements made in the 
segment were false.50 The growers tried to argue that while none of the 
specific statements in the segment were false, the overall implied mes-
sage of the segment was false.51 The court rejected this argument because 
“Such [a rule] would make it difficult for broadcasters to predict whether 
their work would subject them to tort liability. . . . [and] raises 
the . . . chilling effect on speech.”52 
Following the decision, lobbyists began petitioning state legisla-
tures to create statutes that would provide heightened protection for the 
agriculture industry against segments like the one by 60 Minutes.53 That 
is to say, industry sought protection against reports about their products 
that were not demonstrably false. More than twenty-five states consid-
ered agricultural disparagement statutes, and thirteen states enacted such 
laws.54 While the statutes differ in some respects, they share many of the 
same core elements: 
(1) [D]issemination to the public in any manner; (2) of false infor-
mation the disseminator knows [or should have known] to be false; 
(3) stating or implying that a perishable food product is not safe for 
consumption by the consuming public; (4) information is presumed 
false when not based on reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, 
facts, or data; (5) disparagement provides a cause of action for dam-
ages.55 
Had this kind of statute existed during Auvil, it is likely that the ar-
gument made by the apple growers, that harm to their industry was ac-
                                                        
 47. Colleen K. Lynch, Disregarding the Marketplace of Ideas: A Constitutional Analysis of 
Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 18 J.L. & COM. 167, 167 (1998). 
 48. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 800 F. Supp. 928, 930–31 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
 49. Id. at 931. 
 50. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.   
 53. See Margot S. Fell, Agricultural Disparagement Statutes: Tainted Beef, Tainted Speech, 
and Tainted Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 981, 987–88 (1999). 
 54. Semple, supra note 45, at 413. 
 55. Id. 
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tionable even absent a showing of falsity, would have prevailed.56 Criti-
cizing a food product, even if the producer cannot show that what one 
said is false, is now a basis for civil liability in many states.  
B. Comparing Agricultural Disparagement Statutes to  
Product Disparagement 
In a traditional product disparagement case, the plaintiff generally 
must prove that “the defendant: (1) intentionally (2) caused pecuniary 
loss to the plaintiff by (3) falsely stating a fact (4) to a third person, (5) 
knowing that the statement was false or recklessly disregarding its truth 
or falsity.”57 
This legal framework differs from the agricultural disparagement 
statutes in several ways. First, under traditional disparagement liability, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s statement 
was false.58 By contrast, the language used in many agricultural dispar-
agement statutes implies the defendant must prove his or her statements 
were true by showing that they were based on reasonable or reliable sci-
entific evidence.59 Moreover, because a person is liable for food dispar-
agement unless his or her statement is based on reliable scientific evi-
dence, serious questions arise regarding what exactly is reasonable or 
reliable scientific evidence. Hypothetically, if a well-known scientist 
conducts a study, reports on it to a news station such as CBS, but then 
later finds out his methodology was flawed, could the scientist and CBS 
be in violation of an agricultural disparagement statute? Arguably yes. 
Are the lay public precluded from discussing rumors or studies unless 
they have the expertise to confirm the reliability and veracity of the study 
in question? Presumably so. The vague language used in many of the 
statutes and the lack of cases on the subject matter leaves these questions 
open to interpretation, but it is certainly plausible that any negative 
statement—true or not—that lacks a firm scientific grounding could re-
sult in liability.60 
Additionally, in some states agricultural disparagement liability can 
be predicated on a lower mens rea than is typically required. As a general 
matter, liability for product disparagement requires that the defendant act 
                                                        
 56. See Auvil, 67 F.3d at 822. 
 57. Sara Lunsford Kohen, What Ever Happened to Veggie Libel?: Why Plaintiffs Are Not Us-
ing Agricultural Product Disparagement Statutes, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 261, 266 (2011). 
 58. See id. at 269–70. 
 59. See Semple, supra note 45, at 413. 
 60. See Kohen, supra note 57, at 273–74; see generally David J. Bederman, Food Libel: Liti-
gating Scientific Uncertainty in a Constitutional Twilight Zone, 10 DEPAUL L.J. 191, 192 (1998). 
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either knowingly or recklessly with regard to the falsity of the infor-
mation. In some agricultural disparagement statutes, the plaintiff can re-
cover even if the defendant was merely negligent with regard to the falsi-
ty of the information.61 In Alabama, a defendant potentially may be held 
strictly liable.62 
C. Constitutional Concerns with Agricultural Disparity Laws 
The special status of agricultural disparagement relative to defama-
tion law more generally raises serious First Amendment concerns.63 To 
be sure, defamation is one of the historical categories of speech that the 
Court has treated as unprotected.64 But that does not mean that all laws 
purporting to restrict or prohibit defamatory conduct are insulated from 
First Amendment scrutiny.65 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court established 
that when a defamation plaintiff is a public official, he or she must prove 
that the defendant had “actual malice” when he or she made false state-
ments about the plaintiff.66 The Court has expanded this application to 
public figures as well.67 It determines whether an individual is a public 
figure “by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s participa-
tion in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”68 The 
Court has also stated that public figures generally have greater access to 
channels of communication to contradict a lie than the general public, 
and public figures “invite attention and comment” so that they can “in-
fluence the resolution of the issues involved.”69 This allows a court to 
deem a private individual a limited public figure for particular issues de-
pending on the context of the situation.70  
In short, a defamation action for one who can be deemed a public 
figure or limited public figure requires a heightened pleading and proof 
requirement that does not apply to other torts. While the Supreme Court 
                                                        
 61. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(E)(1) (1995); FLA. STAT. § 865.065(2)(a) (1995); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1) (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, § 5-102 (2001) (stating the elements of the 
statutes, including required mens rea). 
 62. ALA. CODE § 6-5-623 (1993) (“It is no defense under this article that the actor did not in-
tend, or was unaware of, the act charged,” which potentially can allow for strict liability). 
 63. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 64. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
 65. Although a few courts have explicitly applied the First Amendment requirement for defa-
mation to product disparagement cases, the Supreme Court itself has not yet had occasion to do so.  
 66. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 344–45. 
 70. Id. at 352. 
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has not specifically addressed whether a product manufacturer is a public 
figure or a limited public figure for issues relating to their product’s safe-
ty or production, such a conclusion seems correct insofar as manufactur-
ers generally seek out as much public attention for their products as pos-
sible and regularly engage with the media. Corporations also have more 
access to the media and channels of communication than a purely private 
party. And at least two district courts have held that a product manufac-
turer was, indeed, a public figure.71  
On the basis of the First Amendment requirement of actual malice 
alone, many state food disparagement statutes are facially unconstitu-
tional. If falsehoods about products are entitled to at least as much First 
Amendment protection as falsehoods about persons, and if corporations 
are public (or limited public) figures, then tort liability cannot exist ab-
sent a showing of actual malice. And yet, many of the agricultural dis-
paragement statutes impose liability on the speaker without also requir-
ing that the speaker act with “actual malice.”72 
Even if a court does not deem the agriculture industry a limited 
public figure, there may be other constitutional concerns arising out of 
existing defamation law. In Gertz, the Supreme Court held that states are 
able to pass statutes regarding liability for defamation so long as those 
statutes “do not impose liability without fault.”73 Thus, the food dispar-
agement statutes that allow for strict liability will almost certainly be 
found unconstitutional.74 
Similarly, in Gertz, the Court held that a negligence standard is ac-
ceptable for defamation claims brought by private individuals, but puni-
tive damages cannot be awarded unless the “actual malice” standard 
from New York Times is satisfied.75 If negligence is the cause of injury in 
a defamation claim and the plaintiff is a private individual, then the 
plaintiff may only recover compensatory damages for an “actual injury” 
suffered from the defamation.76 Thus, the food disparagement statutes 
                                                        
 71. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984) (describing how 
the Supreme Court allowed Bose to be treated as a public figure in a product disparagement case 
following a Consumer Reports review of one of Bose’s products); Quantum Elecs. Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of U.S., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753, 766 (D.R.I. 1995) (finding that Quantum, a manufac-
turer of Ozone ozonators, was a limited purpose public figure as a matter of law because of “the 
preexisting public controversy about ozone and ozonators, Quantum’s clear efforts to influence the 
outcome of the controversy, and Quantum’s access to the media”). 
 72. Bederman, supra note 60, at 206–07. 
 73. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
 74. Kohen, supra note 57. 
 75. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. 
 76. See id. at 349–50. 
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that allow for punitive damages without “actual malice” will likely be 
found unconstitutional under this standard.77 
Finally, the food disparagement statutes implicitly shift the burden 
of proof to the defendant to prove the truthfulness of their criticism, thus 
raising another constitutional concern. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that for defamation cases, it is a “constitutional requirement that 
the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before 
recovering damages.”78 If a food disparagement statute permits liability 
whenever a speaker’s statements are not solidly grounded in reasonable 
and reliable scientific data, then the burden of proof is effectively shifted 
to the defendant to demonstrate that what they said is true. In effect, such 
statutes would presume the falsity of critical statements that cause harm 
to the agricultural industry, and as such are irreconcilable with the consti-
tutional limits imposed on defamation liability.79 
D. Cases Challenging Agricultural Disparagement Statutes 
While these food disparagement laws seem eminently infirm from a 
constitutional perspective, challenges to these statutes in actual cases 
have been shockingly rare. But the infrequency of the challenges flows 
directly from the rarity of the use of the laws—the disparagement stat-
utes are virtually unused in every state.80 Only two cases have resulted in 
published opinions: Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey81 and Action for a 
Clean Environment v. Georgia.82 Neither case addressed the constitu-
tionality of the statutes.83 
When the agricultural industry claims disparaging remarks have 
been made and brings litigation under the meat or food disparagement 
laws, the cost of litigation for defendants is enormous. In 1996, Oprah 
                                                        
 77. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-622 (1993) (“[Plaintiff can recover] damages . . . including but not lim-
ited to, compensatory and punitive damages.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(C) (West 2014) 
(“If the plaintiff establishes that the disseminator knew or should have known that the information 
was false, damages may be awarded, including compensatory and punitive damages . . . .”). 
 78. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
 79. ALA. CODE § 6-5-621(1) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(1) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3:4502(1) (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-253(a) (1994). 
 80. Much like the terrorism crime statutes enacted under the AETA, the laws function like a 
scare tactic, but one that is rarely pursued. “South Dakota is one of 13 states with a food disparage-
ment law, although these laws have not been used very often in litigation.” DELTA & MATSUURA, 
supra note 44, § 11.03. 
 81. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 82. Action for a Clean Env’t v. Georgia, 457 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
 83. Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food Safety in the Era of 
Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 842 (2001); Kohen, supra note 
57, at 271. 
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Winfrey aired a segment on her show about mad cow disease.84 During 
the segment, one of the guests, a farmer named Howard Lyman, made 
statements indicating it was his belief that the threat of mad cow disease 
in the United States could be a worse epidemic than AIDS.85 Following 
the segment, the Texas beef industry experienced an economic depres-
sion that lasted for about three months,86 leading Texas cattle farmers to 
band together and file suit against Oprah using the Texas agricultural 
disparagement statute as their cause of action.87 
A defendant will be found liable under the Texas agricultural dis-
paragement statute if he or she “(1) disseminates in any manner infor-
mation relating to a perishable food product to the public; (2) . . . knows 
the information is false; and (3) the information states or implies that the 
perishable food product is not safe for consumption by the public.”88 In 
determining whether the information is false, the Texas statute provides 
that “the trier of fact shall consider whether the information was based on 
reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data.”89 
After lengthy litigation, the appellate court affirmed the district 
court’s verdict in favor of Oprah and ruled that no statements on the 
show were made with the actual knowledge that they were false.90 The 
district court previously held that there was “no evidence by which a rea-
sonable juror could conclude that the Defendants had actual knowledge 
of the falsity, if any, of the statements made.”91 Because the court found 
that there was not enough evidence to support the defendants’ knowledge 
of the potential falsity of the information as a matter of law, there was no 
ruling on whether the information was actually false. Further, the court 
avoided answering questions regarding the constitutionality of the statute 
by finding that the claim did not fulfill all of the elements of the Texas 
agricultural disparagement statute and dismissing the case.92 
In the only other published case, an environmental group brought a 
case against Georgia, seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitution-
ality of Georgia’s agricultural disparagement statute.93 The court ended 
the case by determining no actual controversy existed because Georgia 
                                                        
 84. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 85. Id. at 683. 
 86. Id. at 684. 
 87. Id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002 (West 1995). 
 88. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002 (West 1995). 
 89. Id. § 96.003. 
 90. Tex. Beef Grp., 201 F.3d at 688. 
 91. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858, 863 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Action for a Clean Env’t v. Georgia, 457 S.E.2d 273, 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
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had no legal interest in the case,94 thus stripping the court of the jurisdic-
tion to opine on the constitutionality of the statute.95 
Currently, there is an ongoing case brought under the South Dakota 
agricultural disparagement statute.96 In March 2012, American Broad-
casting Company News (ABC) covered a product made by Beef Prod-
ucts, Inc. (BPI), a South Dakota based company.97 During its coverage, 
ABC discussed BPI’s product, lean finely textured beef. BPI alleged that 
ABC referred to the beef product as “pink slime” that was unsafe for the 
public to consume and that was an “economic fraud.”98 In response to 
BPI’s allegations, ABC argued that it was merely reporting on the con-
tents of food and how food is labeled, stating it is clearly a matter of pub-
lic interest.99 ABC moved to dismiss the case, but the South Dakota Su-
preme Court denied the motion in May of 2014, ordering the case to 
move on to the discovery phase.100 Now, if the court finds ABC liable for 
agricultural disparagement, BPI would be entitled to $1.2 billion, triple 
the amount of claimed damages.101 As this case continues to progress, it 
seems inevitable that the constitutional challenges to South Dakota’s 
food disparagement law will be litigated. 
It is unclear why more cases have not been brought under these 
statutes. It is possible that these laws are serving their intended purpose: 
stopping people from speaking negatively about the agriculture industry 
for fear of liability. In Texas Beef Group, Lyman was fortunate to have 
Oprah’s financial backing. But in situations where such financial backing 
is not available, defendants might not be successful in their defenses or 
might not be able to afford litigation at all.102 Book publishers, television 
shows, and news networks have made statements implying that they are 
reluctant to publish or air pieces that portray the agriculture industry in a 
negative light.103 
                                                        
 94. See id. at 274. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A (2012). 
 97. Nicole C. Sasaki, Comment, Beef Products, Inc. v. ABC News: (Pink) Slimy Enough to 
Determine the Constitutionality of Agricultural Disparagement Laws?, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
771, 772 (2014). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 772–73. 
 100. Dave Dreeszen, S.D. Supreme Court Denies ABC Appeal in BPI Defamation Case, SIOUX 
CITY J. (May 22, 2014), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/local/a1/s-d-supreme-court-denies-abc-
appeal-in-bpi-defamation/article_ced96cad-4732-5f19-9954-9738b83297d4.html. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Fell, supra note 53, at 1022. 
 103. See Kohen, supra note 57, at 275–76 (stating that book publishers, Discovery Channel, 
and news networks have cancelled their products after being faced with lawsuits under agricultural 
disparagement statutes). 
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Because of the few challenges these laws have faced, legislatures 
bent on disfavoring speech critical of the agricultural industry have be-
come increasingly emboldened. In the face of little resistance to the agri-
cultural disparagement laws, states have taken the next big leap and 
criminalized access to and recording on agricultural sites through a varie-
ty of statutes, colloquially referred to as “Ag Gag laws.” 
III. THE AG GAG LAW ERA 
If terrorism charges deter direct action and disparagement laws chill 
certain forms of speech, Ag Gag laws go one step further by cutting off 
speech critical of food producers at an earlier stage in the process—that 
is to say, Ag Gag laws criminalize the conduct that is necessary to facili-
tate whistleblowing and reporting about the production of food in this 
country.104 The laws criminalize, among other things, deceptive entry—
think Upton Sinclair and his undercover employment at a meatpacking 
plant—and recording without explicit consent by anyone who is pre-
sent—think of a longtime employee who pulls out a cellphone to docu-
ment a major environmental or food safety concern. As Justice Scalia has 
explained in the campaign finance context, if the government is allowed 
to “[c]ontrol any cog in the [speech] machine, [it] can halt the whole ap-
paratus.”105 By cutting off the right to access and to document misdeeds 
in the production of food, these laws cut off a critical supply of speech 
that is critical of the agricultural industry. Food disparagement laws limit 
one’s ability to speak negatively by imposing tort liability, but Ag Gag 
laws go one step further by limiting one’s ability to create the speech 
necessary for the critique. Just as a restriction on pure speech is problem-
atic, so too is a limit on the ability to create speech. As the Court has rec-
ognized, “Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at 
different points in the speech process.”106 
In this regard, it is notable that the rise of Ag Gag laws corresponds 
with the success of recent undercover whistleblowing investigations. Fol-
lowing the largest beef recall in U.S. history, based on an investigation 
                                                        
 104. The term “Ag Gag” was coined by Mark Bitman, an American food journalist, author, and 
columnist for the New York Times. He started using the name Ag Gag in April 2011 when he ex-
plained that the Ag Gag law in Minnesota would “seek to punish not only photographers and videog-
raphers, but those who distribute their work.” Mark Bitman, Who Protects the Animals, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 26, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/?_r=0. 
 104. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 251–52 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
 105. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–37.  
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by the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS)107 and shocking ex-
posés at dairies like the Bettencourt Dairy in Idaho,108 legislators have 
sought to criminalize recording or accessing agricultural facilities.109 Just 
when whistleblowing in the food industry was starting to have an effect, 
legislatures have started criminalizing the efforts to whistleblow in these 
industries. To date, Ag Gag laws have now been introduced in more than 
half of the nation’s states,110 and eight states have enacted Ag Gag 
laws.111 
A. The Introduction of Ag Gag Laws 
The first wave of Ag Gag laws emerged in the early 1990s. In this 
initial wave, Ag Gag laws sought to further protect agricultural facilities 
against bad press and property damage, focusing mainly on intentional 
damage to property and non-consensual entry. These statutes, in a sense, 
did not really do anything new, as they criminalized activity that was 
already criminal. Not surprisingly, there are no reported convictions un-
der these laws. Illustrative of this model is the first Ag Gag law known as 
the Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act, 
which was passed in Kansas in 1990.112 The Kansas law set the founda-
tion for Ag Gag legislation by stating: 
(c) No person shall, without effective consent of the owner and with 
intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility: 
(1) Enter an animal facility, not open to the public, with in-
tent to commit an act prohibited by this section; [or] 
. . . .  
                                                        
 107. Owners of Hallmark Meat Pay $300,000, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2012/11/hallmark-meat-company-settlement-
111612.html. 
 108. Associated Press, Idaho Workers Charged With Animal Cruelty at Bettencourt Dairies’ 
Dry Creek Dairy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ 
watch-animal-cruelty-filmed-idaho-dairy-article-1.1180094. 
 109. Michael McFadden, Exposing Ag Gag, FARM FORWARD (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://farmforward.com/2014/11/07/exposing-ag-gag/. 
 110. Since the early 1990s, “almost 30 states have introduced bills banning or restricting un-
dercover investigations surrounding the abuse of farmed animals.” Id. 
 111. Idaho (passed in 2014) (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2014)), Iowa (passed in 
2012) (IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West 2012)), Missouri (passed in 2012) (MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 578.013 (West 2012)), South Carolina (passed in 2012) (S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-21 (2012)), Mon-
tana (passed in 1991) (MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-101–105 (West 2012)), North Dakota (passed in 
1990) (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 1991)), and Kansas (passed in 1991) (KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (West 2012)). 
 112. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (West 2012). 
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(3) enter an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, 
video camera or by other means.113 
In 1991, Montana enacted a similar law, but unlike any other Ag 
Gag law, Montana’s law directly addressed defamation by making it a 
crime “to enter an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video 
camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal defama-
tion.”114 The Montana law does not make any material changes to the 
scope of criminal liability—one is only guilty if he has the intent to de-
fame, that is, maliciously spread mistruths.  
Later in the same year, North Dakota passed a more expansive ver-
sion of an Ag Gag law, creating criminal liability for people releasing 
animals. Additionally, the North Dakota law criminalizes people not only 
for committing one of the acts described in the statute, but also for at-
tempting to commit an act described in the statute or attempting to use 
recording equipment: 
No person without the effective consent of the owner may: 
1. Intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility, an animal or 
property in or on the animal facility, or any enterprise conducted at 
the animal facility. 
2. Acquire or otherwise exercise control over an animal facility or 
an animal or other property from an animal facility with the intent 
to deprive the owner and to damage the enterprise conducted at the 
facility. 
. . . . 
6. Enter an animal facility and use or attempt to use a camera, video 
recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment. 
7. Intentionally turn out or release any animal in or on an animal fa-
cility.115 
Each of these first-wave Ag Gag laws shared a threshold require-
ment for criminal liability—they all require non-consensual entry and 
some other act such as non-consensual recording. That is, in addition to 
                                                        
 113. Id. § 47-1827(c)(1), (3). 
 114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(d) (West 2012) (“A person who does not have the 
effective consent of the owner and who intends to damage the enterprise conducted at an animal 
facility may not . . . enter an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera, or other 
means with the intent to commit criminal defamation . . . .”). 
 115. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 1991) (“No person without the effective 
consent of the owner may . . . enter an animal facility and use or attempt to use a camera, video 
recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment.”). 
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traditional trespass, one could now face liability for the non-consensual 
recording or documenting of unsavory practices as well. As explained 
below, the current generation of Ag Gag laws criminalize a broader 
range of conduct, including recording while present based on consent. 
B. Current Ag Gag Laws 
Twenty-one years after the first Ag Gag laws were enacted, in 
2012, a new wave of even more restrictive Ag Gag laws emerged. This 
new generation of Ag Gag laws seeks to provide corporate agriculture 
production facilities with an unprecedented layer of secrecy. No other 
industry enjoys such broad anti-whistleblower statutes. All industries are 
protected against trespass and the theft of trade secrets. For example, un-
der the federal theft of trade secrets statute, it is a crime to steal or copy 
valuable information with the intent to injure the owner of the trade se-
cret.116 However, no other single industry has specific laws protecting it 
from all whistleblowing, regardless of whether trade secrets or intellectu-
al property is threatened. 
Iowa spearheaded the new wave of Ag Gag laws by enacting the 
first of this new, more restrictive set of prohibitions on whistleblowing. 
The Iowa law provides: 
1. A person is guilty of agricultural production facility fraud if the 
person willfully does any of the following: 
. . . . 
b. Makes a false statement or representation as part of an 
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural 
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be 
false, and makes the statement with intent to commit an act 
not authorized by the owner . . . [and] knowing that the act 
is not authorized.117 
Also in 2012, Utah passed a similar law that provides: 
(2) A person is guilty of agricultural operation interference if the 
person: 
(a) without consent from the owner of the agricultural op-
eration, or the owner’s agent, knowingly or intentionally 
records an image of, or sound from, the agricultural opera-
tion by leaving a recording device on the agricultural op-
eration; 
                                                        
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012). 
 117. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(a)–(b) (2012). 
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(b) obtains access to an agricultural operation under false 
pretenses; [or] 
(c)(i) applies for employment at an agricultural operation 
with the intent to record an image of, or sound from, the ag-
ricultural operation; 
(ii) knows, at the time that the person accepts employment 
at the agricultural operation, that the owner of the agricul-
tural operation prohibits the employee from recording an 
image of, or sound from, the agricultural operation; and 
(iii) while employed at, and while present on, the agricul-
tural operation, records an image of, or sound from, the ag-
ricultural operation; . . . .118 
Not surprisingly, legislators who advocate for these new Ag Gag 
laws strategically avoid discussing animal cruelty, food safety, sanita-
tion, and environmental problems and instead redirect the debate toward 
protecting people whose livelihoods depend on the agriculture industry. 
In fact, a substantial number of legislators who favor Ag Gag laws center 
their arguments around the falsity of undercover videos and prey on the 
common fears of families and small businesses of being misrepresented 
and put out of work by extreme activists. In states like Idaho, where a 
large portion of the population is involved in the agriculture industry, 
these arguments proved convincing. In 2014, Idaho’s version of an Ag 
Gag law passed the House and Senate by an overwhelming majority.119 
The text of the Idaho statute provides: 
(1) A person commits the crime of interference with agricultural 
production if the person knowingly: 
. . . . 
(c) Obtains employment with an agricultural product facili-
ty by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to 
cause economic or other injury to the facility’s operations, 
livestock, crops, owners, personnel, equipment, buildings, 
premises, business interests or customers; [or] 
(d) Enters an agricultural production facility that is not 
open to the public and, without the facility owner’s express 
consent or pursuant to judicial process or statutory authori-
                                                        
 118. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a)–(c)(iii) (West 2012). 
 119. This Bill passed the House with 56 Ayes and 14 Nays and the Senate with 23 Ayes and 10 
Nays. See S. 1337, 62d Leg., Senate Bill 1337 Legislative History (Idaho 2014), available at 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2014/S1337.htm. 
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zation, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of 
an agricultural production facility’s operations; . . . .120 
Notably, under Idaho law, it is a crime to engage in an employ-
ment-based investigation (or to otherwise gain access by deception) or to 
engage in recording activities when one is otherwise lawfully present.121 
This goes well beyond the previous generation of Ag Gag laws, which 
have gone entirely unused. And, as previously noted,122 the introduction 
of Idaho’s Ag Gag law was a direct response to an undercover investiga-
tion video that was publicized by Mercy for Animals.123 The video 
showed workers at Bettencourt Dairies dragging sick and injured cows 
across concrete with chains attached to the cows’ necks, jumping on and 
kicking cows as they moaned in distress, and beating them viciously.124 
Like many undercover investigations that have been publicized, airing 
this video on ABC grabbed the public’s attention.125 Thus, in an effort to 
rescue Idaho’s corporate agriculture industry, the Idaho Dairymen’s As-
sociation126 began drafting an Ag Gag bill and informing people of their 
vulnerability to undercover investigations.127 
The bill was later introduced on a Monday, approved by the Senate 
Agricultural Affairs Committee on Tuesday, and passed the full Senate 
on Friday of the same week.128 In just over two-and-a-half weeks after 
being introduced, the bill was codified and effective, proving the steam-
roller power of agricultural lobbying efforts.129 Dan Steenson, a lobbyist 
                                                        
 120. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a)–(d) (West 2014). 
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779150704.html. See also Hearing on S.B. 1337 Before the S. Agric. Affairs Comm., 2014 Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. 2 (Idaho 2014) [hereinafter S. Agric. Affairs] (statement of Dan Steenson, legal counsel 
for Idaho Dairymen’s Association) (“I proudly represent the hard-working dairy farmers who com-
prise Idaho’s -- the Idaho Dairymen’s Association. . . . I prepared this legislation at their re-
quest . . . .”) (on file with author). 
 128. It was introduced on February 10th, 2014. It passed the Senate on February 14th and 
passed the House on February 26th. On the 28th it was signed into law. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
7042 (West 2014); see also Senate Bill 1337, STATE OF IDAHO LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2014/S1337.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
 129. Titled the Agriculture Security Bill, this legislation had an emergency clause that allowed 
it to take effect immediately. Dan Flynn, Idaho ‘Ag Gag’ Bill Clears State Senate, Heads to House, 
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who drafted the bill, justified the urgency of the bill to the House Agri-
cultural Affairs Committee by explaining that farmers and dairymen 
were threatened by “extremist groups . . . who masquerade as employees 
to infiltrate farms in the hope of discovering and recording what they 
believe to be animal abuse,”130 because such groups go on to prosecute 
farms “in the court of public opinion.”131 
The court of public opinion is the last place that the corporate agri-
culture industry wants to be, and many who supported the bill were not 
afraid to address this fear. Indeed, many of the bill’s proponents continu-
ally referred to activists and journalists as terrorists. Tony VanderHulst, 
the president of the Idaho Dairymen’s Association, introduced himself as 
the representative of all dairy producers in Idaho, and explained that the 
bill “protects from systematic attacks by terrorists.”132 He also continual-
ly pointed out that “farm terrorists” lie and are deceitful.133 Along similar 
lines, Senator Jim Rice explained that “it’s important to know that [these 
video investigations are] a compilation” and that much of the clips have 
been “cut and moved” to misrepresent the truth.134 He also pointed out 
that the “edited video was used to attack this innocent Idaho farmer in an 
attempt to utterly destroy him economically.”135 And Representative 
Linden Bateman stated that this film “is not at all remotely characteristic 
to what happens in Idaho or anywhere else in the West as far as I’m con-
cerned.”136 Missing from this testimony, however, was any mention of 
the fact that no investigation in Idaho (or any state) has resulted in a suc-
cessful defamation lawsuit. If the information conveyed to the public by 
the activist investigators was not actually true, then the groups and indi-
viduals responsible for the investigation would be subject to liability and 
potentially punitive damages for defamation. But supporters of Ag Gag 
laws prefer the fiction to the facts; they do not mention that the videos 
and exposes released to the public are in fact true, and if one ever is not, 
it will result in massive compensatory and punitive damages to the ag-
grieved party. Instead, VanderHulst simply threw up a distracting smoke 
                                                                                                                            
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/02/idahos-senate-
passed-ag-gag-bill-close-to-vote-in-house/#.VRRr5vnF92s. 
 130. Hearing Before the H. Agric. Affairs Comm., 2014 Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 6 (Idaho 2014) 
[hereinafter H. Agric. Affairs] (on file with author). 
 131. Id. at 7. 
 132. Id. at 21. 
 133. Tony VanderHulst’s full quote: “Why should those who lie, are deceitful, misrepresent 
themselves, and openly have an anti-animal/agricultural agenda be allowed to masquerade under the 
banner.” Id. at 21. 
 134. S. Deb. on S.B. 1337, 2d Reg. Sess., at 6 (Idaho 2014) (on file with author).  
 135. Id. at 8. 
 136. H. Deb. on S.B. 1337, 2d Reg. Sess., at 3 (Idaho 2014) (on file with author).  
2015] Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future 1339 
screen of rhetoric: “These farm terrorists use media and sensationalism to 
attempt to steal the integrity of the producer and their reputation, and 
their ability to conduct business in Idaho by declaring him guilty in the 
court of public opinion.”137 
Many others who supported the bill directed the debate away from 
animal cruelty with the same tactics. Senator Jim Patrick, who sponsored 
the bill, stated, “[T]errorism ha[s] been used by enemies for centuries 
[to] destroy the ability to produce food.”138 He justified the need for the 
bill by asserting, “This is the way you combat your enemies.”139 In ef-
fect, the advocates for the bill collectively articulated that terrorists were 
prosecuting the agriculture industry in the court of public opinion, leav-
ing the agriculture industry with no way of even attempting to prove its 
innocence. Thus, the powerful representatives of the agriculture industry 
strategically came up with a law allowing these roles to be flipped: the 
industry has control of who is prosecuted, the activists are the crimi-
nals,140 and farms like Bettencourt Dairies are the true victims. In effect, 
the abused animals are erased from the picture. 
In essence, the industry wants to do what it could not under dispar-
agement laws; it wants to punish those who damage its reputation 
through nondefamatory speech. Indeed, in a telling provision of the Ida-
ho Ag Gag law, investigators charged with agricultural interference are 
required to pay “restitution” of two times the damages to the facility.141 
That is to say, the Idaho law would require a journalist or activist to 
compensate a farm that has its reputation injured by the production and 
distribution of a truthful audiovisual recording. Nothing is more anathe-
ma to the First Amendment than punishing someone for the impact of 
their truthful speech in shaping political values.  
                                                        
 137. H. Agric. Affairs, supra note 130, at 21. 
 138. S. Agric. Affairs, supra note 127, at 46. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Any expose or recording that does not reveal truth can be actionable defamation. For 
example, in 2014, the Tenth Circuit upheld an insurance broker’s defamation claim against NBC’s 
Dateline for an exposé news report titled “Tricks of the Trade.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. 
NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1149 (10th Cir. 2014). This short report was a compilation of 
video segments that had been carefully edited and rearranged. Id. at 1132. The finished product took 
112 words out of a two-day seminar and depicted the broker “as one who teaches insurance agents 
how to employ misrepresentations and other questionable tactics in order to dupe senior citizens into 
purchasing inappropriate annuity products.” Id. This case set precedent by demonstrating that even a 
video recording can be defamatory if it shows only a few minutes out of many hours of recorded 
material that somehow misleads the public or produces false impressions. Id. For this reason, the 
agriculture industry now only has to prove that undercover videos produce false impressions to 
succeed in a defamation claim. A false “gist” constitutes actionable defamation. 
 141. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (West 2014). 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF AG GAG 
A. Quick Report Laws 
As the agenda behind the current Ag Gag laws becomes increasing-
ly transparent, advocates of Ag Gag laws have had to find alternative 
ways to gain support. Thus, Colorado and Missouri have started to pave a 
new road for enacting Ag Gag laws by morphing the legislation into 
mandatory report laws.142 Similar to child abuse mandatory reporting 
laws, these new laws require reporting of animal abuse within as little as 
twenty-four hours. Missouri’s law states: 
Whenever any farm animal professional videotapes or otherwise 
makes a digital recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm 
animal subjected to abuse or neglect . . . such farm animal profes-
sional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital record-
ing to a law enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the re-
cording. . . . An intentional violation of any provision of this section 
is a class A misdemeanor.143 
Similarly, in Colorado, a bill pending at the time of this writing 
provides: “Any person who fails to provide law enforcement with physi-
cal evidence of animal abandonment, mistreatment or neglect within 48 
hours after obtaining the physical evidence commits the offense[,] . . . a 
class 3 misdemeanor.”144 
Representatives and senators portray these bills as aids for animal 
welfare. These are not Ag Gag laws, so the mantra goes, these are laws 
designed to protect animals. And there is a certain superficial appeal to 
the idea that refusing to report abuse is tantamount to abuse itself. But 
the reality is a bit more complicated. In intent and effect these laws im-
pede journalistic and other undercover investigations of food producing 
facilities.  
First, there is no evidence that there is a problem with people fail-
ing to report animal abuse to authorities, and thus these laws provide no 
concrete benefits to animals.145 No one has suggested that there is a rash 
of domestic animal (or farmed animal) abuse that is simply kept secret. 
On the other hand, these laws do effectively accomplish the agriculture 
                                                        
 142. Colorado introduced a mandatory report law in 2014, and it failed. Mandatory Reports of 
Animal Abuse, S.B. 15-042, 70th Leg. (Colo. 2015). 
 143. MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013 (West 2012). 
 144. Colorado Senate Committee of Reference Amendment, S.B. 15-042 (Jan. 23, 2015).  
 145. See Justin Marceau & Nancy Leong, Proposed Bill Will Lead to More Animal Abuse, Not 
Less, DENVER POST (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_27381708/proposed-
bill-will-lead-more-animal-abuse-not. 
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industry’s purpose of making it impossible to expose what is actually 
going on inside factory farms. For one thing, if every act of cruelty re-
quires an immediate outing of the undercover investigator, then showing 
patterns of abuse or complicity on the part of management is impossible. 
The considerable costs and efforts expended in obtaining undercover 
employment have to be forfeited at the first sign of criminal abuse. This 
means that an investigator who observes a single act of abuse on an ani-
mal that is walking to its lawful (and imminent) slaughter must end the 
investigation, turn the evidence relating to the single act over to law en-
forcement, and abandon any hope of establishing patterns of abuse or 
systemic failings on the part of the industry. Particularly for discrete and 
completed acts of abuse—as opposed to some ongoing torture of an ani-
mal over the course of weeks or months—it makes no sense to force the 
untimely end of an investigation. The journalist or investigator, not the 
government, should be able to decide what she wants to speak about, 
when, and what form the speech will take. After all, US jurisdictions 
have resoundingly renounced the notion that it should be a crime to fail 
to report a crime, even when the crime one observes is murder or rape. 
So it would be incongruous in the extreme to say that for this one crime 
(perhaps just a misdemeanor), reporting must be immediate and without 
exceptions. The very uniqueness of such a requirement belies the claim 
that something sinister and speech suppressing underlies these legislative 
efforts. 
Moreover, it is very difficult for a lay worker to be able to detect 
what is and what is not animal abuse. For example, the excruciating act 
of shackling and hoisting a cow may be legal, but a single relatively 
slight punch to the same cow for sadistic pleasure may be a crime. More 
importantly, quick report laws force liability and blame to fall entirely at 
the feet of the low-income workers, barring efforts to show complicity on 
the part of management by exposing explicit or implicit sanction for 
abuse.  
Simply put, quick report laws are the proverbial wolf in sheep’s 
clothing. The industry hopes that the public will be enticed by the logical 
sounding imperative that all abuse be quickly reported. But the industry 
knows that such a mandate will make long-term investigations impossi-
ble by forcing undercover investigators to out themselves to law en-
forcement at the first sight of an act of abuse. These laws do nothing to 
protect animals, but threaten to upend the model of whistleblowing that 
has emerged as the gold standard among modern animal activists—the 
employment-based investigation. 
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B. Expanding the Definition of Trespass: The SLAPP Suit146 
Another form of Ag Gag related litigation has emerged through the 
creative use of existing trespass laws to harass nonprofits and activists. 
An illustrative example is a pending trespass case in Wyoming against 
the Western Watershed Project (WWP). Among other things, WWP 
monitors water quality in federal waterways.147 Recently, WWP found 
that contaminant levels, including E. coli, were hundreds of times higher 
than the lawful limit.148 The E. coli appears to be the result of cattle graz-
ing adjacent to the waterways in question. In response to the water quali-
ty findings, the sixteen individual Wyoming ranchers whose cattle were 
using the land along the waterways banded together and filed a suit for 
civil trespassing against the WWP.149 They sued for trespass because 
someone revealed an E. coli risk present in the waterways adjacent to 
their lands. 
The right to be free from trespass is a sacred American tradition. 
One has a right to remain free from intrusion on his private land. But the 
damages for trespass are generally nominal unless the party can show 
some actual harm. For this reason, it is uncommon for someone to sue, 
for example, the neighbor kids who frequently cut across one’s front yard 
while running to the school bus. The school kids have trespassed, but so 
long as they did not cause any actual damage, the expected recovery 
would not normally justify a lawsuit. Taking this analogy one (admitted-
ly morbid) step further, imagine that in cutting across a fenceless yard, 
the school kids fall into a pit of dead bodies. On such facts, the kids’ 
trespass was illegal and their trespass was the “but for” cause of the dis-
covery of human bodies. One could still sue the kids for trespass, but as 
in the initial hypothetical, the damages for such a trespass are nominal. 
The serial killer whose pile of bodies is discovered may be more unhap-
py about trespassing kids than the average person would be, but the fact 
that the kids discovered his crime (or his victims) does not make the kids 
the cause of the harm to the murder victims. To sue these children (or 
prosecute them) is to try and punish them for the very activity that dis-
covered the public harm. The relatives of the victims in my hypothetical, 
                                                        
 146. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 
(1996). 
 147. Landowners File Trespass Lawsuit Against Western Watershed Project, COUNTY 10 (June 
6, 2014), http://county10.com/2014/06/16/landowners-file-trespass-lawsuit-western-watersheds-
project/. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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no less than the persons given notice of E. coli in federal waterways they 
use, might find punishing the messenger a very strange choice.  
The same general reasoning applies to the trespass case against 
WWP.150 Even assuming WWP trespassed, which they vigorously and 
credibly contest, the harm to the ranchers is nominal.151 The harm to the 
ranchers is no different when a hunter trespasses to shoot a deer or a 
WWP intern trespasses to test a water sample. But the fact that the 
ranchers brought this lawsuit against WWP (and never have brought such 
a case against hunters) strongly suggests that they believe WWP is re-
sponsible for harming their reputation by publishing data suggesting that 
their grazing practices have resulted in serious damage to public water-
ways. In this way, the traditional law of trespass is being distorted into an 
Ag gag effort; they seek to silence the reporting of the data and treat the 
data as having been caused (or tainted) by the trespass. 
This trespass suit reflects an effort by the agricultural industry to 
divert attention away from their practices and to vilify WWP. Following 
the playbook of Ag Gag laws, the lawsuit seeks to kill the messenger for 
delivering a nondefamatory, truthful message about modern agricultural 
practices. Making the motives of such litigation transparent, the Wyo-
ming legislature, at the urging of the ranching community, recently 
passed a law that would prevent state agencies from relying on infor-
mation gained during a trespass. The proposed bill, which was intro-
duced explicitly as a way to curb the power of WWP, states: 
No resource data collected [while trespassing] is admissible in evi-
dence in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding, other than 
a prosecution for [trespassing] or a civil action against the violator. 
This subsection applies whether or not the [trespassing] was prose-
cuted or resulted in a conviction. . . . Resource data collected [while 
trespassing] in the possession of any governmental entity . . . shall 
be expunged by the entity from all files and data bases, and it shall 
not be considered in determining any agency action.152 
As referenced above, resource data is defined as “data relating to 
land or land use, including but not limited to data regarding agriculture, 
minerals, geology, history, cultural artifacts, archeology, air, water, soil, 
                                                        
 150. See Def’s Mot. Dismiss at 5, Frank Ranches Inc. v. Ratner, No. 40007 (D. Wyo. Dec. 11, 
2014). 
 151. I represent WWP in this case and my views are obviously shaped by this fact. WWP’s 
defense to trespass includes the fact that they claim to have accessed the waterways on federal ease-
ments. 
 152. Trespassing to Collect Data, S. File 0012, 63d Leg. (Wyo. 2015), available at 
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conservation, habitat, vegetation or animal species.”153 This law, then, is 
the functional equivalent of making it impermissible for the government 
to prosecute the serial murderer when the bodies are discovered only be-
cause the kids trespassed. If an environmental activist crossed private 
property without the permission of the landowner and discovered that the 
landowner was putting cyanide into the water supply, the activist would 
not be able to compel any kind of state agency action because the agency 
would be forced to ignore any data gathered. The law, then, is just the 
latest in a series of efforts to silence the critics of agriculture; it is an ex-
plicit effort to prevent state agencies from taking action to correct harms 
to the environment based on valid water quality data. Like other Ag Gag 
laws, there is no requirement that the information be actually false. In-
stead, politically valuable information, even information relevant to pub-
lic health, must be ignored if the industry contests the method by which it 
was gathered. Bills like this give lie to the claim that Ag Gag efforts are 
only about protecting property rights. These laws (and related actions) 
are about insulating bad actors from whistleblowing and accountability 
for their bad acts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The trinity of animal activism is direct action, criticism (and litiga-
tion), and information gathering through investigation. Each of these 
tried and tested methods face legal barriers in the form of terrorism stat-
utes, food disparagement laws, and now Ag Gag laws. Ag Gag laws 
themselves are quickly evolving. The initial statutes required an unlawful 
entry, but the second generation of such laws criminalizes all access by 
deception and recording. Still another wave of Ag Gag laws—quick re-
porting and trespass—seeks to control the manner and timing of the use 
of information gathered. In short, Ag Gag laws operate at differing points 
along the speech continuum, some criminalizing the production of an 
anti-industry message, and others criminalizing the manner of distribu-
tion of such messages. All of these laws share a common purpose: inca-
pacitating an increasingly influential movement—the animal rights 
movement. Anyone interested in food safety, worker rights, environmen-
tal protection, or animal rights, should be deeply concerned about the 
proliferation of these laws. 
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